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In this essay Professor Janger considers the role of bankruptcy judges in
public bankruptcy cases, in light of the scholarly literature on public law
judging. He explores the extent to which bankruptcy judges engage in the
fiscal restructuring of a municipality use tools, and face constraints, similar
to those utilized by federal district court judges in structural reform cases,
where constitutional norms are at issue. In both types of cases, judges face a
legitimacy gap that exists when vindicating legal norms requires detailed
contextualized relief. Successful judges in both contexts are able to create, in
effect, a legitimacy feedback loop consisting of five elements: (1) norm; (2)
information; (3) participation; (4) consent; and (5) enforcement. These five
elements work together in a loop. First, the legal norm that gives the judge
jurisdiction over the dispute at the front end, an intermediate institution for
developing information and facilitating consent in the middle, and finally
judicial power intervenes to review the agreement and enforce it at the back
end.
INTRODUCTION
This piece is a nested dialogue, and the start of a larger project.
Professor Melissa Jacoby, my co-panelist and frequent co-author has, in
prior work, analyzed the role of the judge in the Detroit and now Puerto Rico
bankruptcy cases, describing an emerging practice template that she calls,
“the blueprint.”1 She has taken a deep dive, and is steeped both in the cases
themselves, and the literature. I, by contrast, am just beginning. I have written
about the role of judges in bankruptcy cases, though not for a while, and not
in the context of public bankruptcies.2 This piece begins my own process of
triangulation. Professor Jacoby and I do not always start in the same place,
but we almost always end up agreeing. In this piece, I write alone, engaging
with her work and seeking to create a dialogue between the jurisprudence
surrounding judging in bankruptcy, and the civil procedure literature on
“public law judging.”
1. SeeMelissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE
J. ON REG. 55, 108 (2016) [hereinafter Jacoby, Detroit Bankruptcy]; see also Melissa B. Jacoby,
Presiding over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now and Puerto Rico, 91AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 389–
90 (2017).
2. See generally Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence
and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001) [hereinafter Janger, Crystals and Mud]; Edward
J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy,
44WM. &MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003) [hereinafter Janger,Muddy Property].
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The intellectual starting point is the classic series of articles by Abram
Chayes, Owen Fiss, and Judith Resnik about “public law” judging in
“structural reform” cases.3 While that exchange focused on constitutional
class action litigation in federal court, it is not lost on either of us that
bankruptcy referees were engaging in “managerial” and often “structural
judging” before the terms had been coined. Modern bankruptcy judges have
been finding ways to guide multi-party, multi-dispute, multi-centric cases,
albeit among private companies, for decades. Indeed, in the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978, Congress felt it necessary to take steps to make the role of
bankruptcy judges less managerial and more classically “judicial.”4 While I
previously considered the literature on public law judging as part of a defense
the central role of bankruptcy judges in a system of negotiated dispute
resolution,5 Professor Jacoby has taken on a more ambitious task—
evaluating the institutional structure of bankruptcy cases where entire
political subdivisions are being financially reconfigured.
Hence the nested dialogues: (1) Janger with Jacoby over the “blueprint”;
and (2) Janger engaging the literature on public law judging. My “modest”
goal is to articulate a framework for a jurisprudence of public law bankruptcy
judging. This essay is, therefore, divided into two parts: First, I will look to
the Chayes morphology to situate the bankruptcy judge on the spectrum
between traditional judge and “public law judge,” and contrast the role of
bankruptcy judges in public bankruptcies with that in private restructurings.
Next, I will evaluate the emerging blueprint for public bankruptcies in light
of the subsequent literature on public law judging through the lens of the
Detroit and Puerto Rico bankruptcies. In particular, I will explore the
common problem of establishing the public legitimacy of judicial actions that
reshape public institutions and even polities.
I. THE MAPPING: PUBLIC LAW JUDGING V. BANKRUPTCY
JUDGING V. PUBLIC BANKRUPTCY JUDGING
Most public interest lawyers familiar with class action practice would not
see themselves as having much common ground with bankruptcy lawyers.
They live on opposite sides of the public law/private law divide. This binary
has always been descriptively inaccurate. Class action practice evolved, in
part, out of “common fund” or “limited fund” cases where a court had to
divide a pool of assets, be it a decedent’s estate or the proceeds of a liquidated
3. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
4. BRUCEG. CARRUTHERS&TERENCEC. HALLIDAY, RESCUINGBUSINESS: THEMAKING OF
CORPORATEBANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THEUNITED STATES 470–505 (1998).
5. See Janger, Crystals and Mud, supra note 2 at 580–81; Janger, Muddy Property, supra note
2 at 1813–15, 1858–61, 1873.
2017] Jurisprudence of Public Law Bankruptcy Judging 41
firm, to pay everyone. A bankruptcy case is the classic “limited fund” case.6
The bankruptcy judge simultaneously resolves disputes about the validity and
priority of claims,7 while also supervising the realization of value from the
debtor’s assets or operations.8 Determining how to maximize value further
adds questions of governance and business judgment.9 Thus, bankruptcy
judges have always lived in a multiparty world, adjudicating claims of
entitlement and priority against the residual estate of the debtor, but also
choosing among business strategies and making projections about likely
future outcomes. Indeed, the concept of group representation of classes of
claimants predates the current Bankruptcy Code, dating back to § 338 of the
former Bankruptcy Act.10
Business reorganizations are also structural. A financial restructuring,
like school desegregation and prison reform, seeks to vindicate rights
(whether financial or constitutional) by reshaping an ongoing institution.
Public bankruptcies take this last area of commonality one step further.
Where the restructuring entity is a municipality, territory, or sovereign state,
the public/private line is obliterated. Bankruptcy judges must balance
creditors’ claims against the needs of cities to provide services to their
citizens. The judge’s adjudication is in the deepest sense constitutional, albeit
with a small “c.” Here, I examine the bankruptcy judge as a “public law”
judge, and ask, “To what extent does that descriptive model help us to
understand public bankruptcy cases like Detroit, Puerto Rico, and even
sovereign cases like Greece and Argentina?” In particular, I consider the
blending of the practical (and political) aspects of dispute resolution with the
legal legitimacy of the outcomes.
A. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE LAW JUDGING: THECHAYES
MORPHOLOGY
In 1976, Abram Chayes claimed that a new model of litigation had
emerged in contradistinction to the traditional account of adjudication.11
Private law litigation was, as he described it:
(1) bipolar
6. For a classic example of a common fund case, see, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Tr., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506, 507 (2012).
8. Id. §§ 363, 1129.
9. The principle governance question in Chapter 11 is whether to reorganize or liquidate. This
question implicates complex strategic questions about how to best realize value for the benefit of
the estate by selling assets, selling the business, fixing the business, or recapitalizing the business.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 338 (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 738). § 338 was first added as § 44
of the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
11. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1282–89.
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(2) retrospective
(3) the remedy is tightly linked to the right
(4) the episode/dispute is self-contained
(5) the case is party initiated and controlled.12
Some of these traditional aspects of litigation were, as Chayes
acknowledged, overdrawn. Declaratory judgments and injunctions can be
prospective.13 The case need not be strictly bipolar, but this does capture the
image of a judge resolving a dispute about a property line, or awarding
damages based on a past assault or breach of contract. Any lawyer, familiar
with bankruptcy practice, at least since 1938 would, however, likely laugh
and say “bankruptcy has never been like this.” Cases under Chapter 11, and
before that—Articles X and XI, have always been multipolar, prospective,
negotiated, involved the global affairs of a complex enterprise, and were
often driven by events rather than adjudication of legal disputes, per se.14
Chayes then argues that the new model of public law litigation has a
different set of characteristics:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped
primarily by the court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and
legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form
logically derived from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to
the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on
flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences
for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its
administration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement
of governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for
credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to
ensure a just and viable outcome.
12. Id. at 1282–83.
13. Id. at 1293.
14. See generallyDAVIDA. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’SDOMINION: A HISTORY OFBANKRUPTCY LAW
INAMERICA (2003).
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(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private
individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of
public policy.15
Again, to a bankruptcy lawyer, the reflex reaction is to exclaim,
“bankruptcy cases have always been like that.” When these characteristics
are mapped onto the various types of bankruptcy cases, it is striking how
thoroughly Chapter 11, and even more so Chapter 9, appear to fit within
Chayes’ morphology of public law litigation. One might argue that the
modern Bankruptcy Code dates from 1978, two years after Chayes’ article.
However, as noted above, the basic structure of a reorganization case dates
back to the Chandler Act of 1938.16
Not all bankruptcy judging deviates from the classic model. While a
Chapter 7 case is multi-party, it lacks the other aspects. The case is defined
by the assets of the firm.17 The relief is retrospective with regard to
establishing claims to entitlement.18 Once the assets have been distributed,
the case is closed.19 In liquidation cases, the bankruptcy judge takes cases as
they come—defined by the parties. The rights adjudicated are principally
private, and adjudication within an adversary proceeding within a bankruptcy
case places the judge in an even more traditional judicial role.
By contrast, Chapter 11 shares many aspects of public law judging. In
particular, the goals of preserving “going concern” value and/or to fix the
business complicate the questions of value allocation and governance. The
scope of the case is often shaped by the debtor in the first instance, but power
may shift over the course of the case. Where a firm is structured as a group,
the debtor may choose to have some subsidiaries file for bankruptcy, and
others not. Where the debtor wishes to preserve commercial relationships, it
may elect to pay critical vendors20 or assume certain contracts.21 As with a
Chapter 7 case, the typical Chapter 11 case is multi-party and multipolar. The
relief affects all of a debtors’ owners and creditors.22 The disputes are often
not between debtor and creditor, but among the creditors themselves. The
cases are decidedly not retrospective. When the time comes to choose
between confirming or rejecting a plan, or reorganizing or liquidating, the
question is usually made on the basis of predictions about how the firm will
15. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1302.
16. Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
18. Id. § 726.
19. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009 (at least as a formal matter).
20. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–72 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Just for Feet, Inc.,
242 B.R. 821, 823–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Lehigh and New England Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570,
581 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Columbia
Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 191–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
22. Id. §§ 524, 1141.
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perform in the future. Is the firm worth more dead than alive? Which strategy
will realize the most value for the estate?23
Indeed, with regard to decisions about value maximization and
allocation, the process is designed as a structured negotiation.24 There are
strict rules about the process of approval, including disclosure and voting
rules, as well as minimum standards for confirmability. The precise details
are worked out through negotiation.25 Whether the court continues to be
involved varies, depending on whether the case is a reorganization or sale.
But even after a plan is confirmed or the business is sold, there may be
avoidance actions or other litigation activities that continue, and the plan may
even be modified if necessary.26 Also, it is not as uncommon as one might
think for firms to refile if the planned restructuring fails.27 The extent to
which a judge controls the structure of the case depends on the nature of the
debtor and the style of the judge. It is difficult to generalize, but this is true
about public law cases as well. Finally, in private Chapter 11 cases, the statute
is federal, but the rights adjudicated are private.
This quick review of Chapter 11 judging in light of the Chayes’
morphology suggests that the role of the judge in public law litigation may
not be unique to public law litigation or litigation over public rights. This
raises an important question: does the addition of a private v. public, or a
citizen v. state aspect fundamentally change the nature of judicial role? Cases
like Detroit and Puerto Rico provide a lens into this inquiry. And, at first
glance, it might seem as if the difference is not all that great. Chapter 11 cases
differ from Chapter 9 cases only in the “public” nature of the grievance, and
even then, the difference might seem relatively small. After all, the dispute
in a Chapter 9 case is still about adjustment of debt—how much a
municipality is going to pay on its debt contracts.
23. Much of bankruptcy scholarship is devoted to figuring out how to optimize the decision
whether to continue the firm or not. See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making:
An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON. 381,
382–83 (2007).
24. SeeMelissa Jacoby & Edward Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: The Price of Process in Chapter 11
Cases, 123 YALE L. J. 862, 866 (2014).
25. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129.
26. Id. §§ 544, 547, 548, 550 (avoidance); id. § 1127 (modification).
27. See Edward I. Altman, Revisiting the Recidivism - Chapter 22 Phenomenon in the U.S.
Bankruptcy System, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 254, 254 (2014); see also LYNN LOPUCKI,
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT 97–102 (2006).
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B. PUBLIC LAW JUDGING: BEYOND THECHAYESMORPHOLOGY
The focus on the “techniques” of judging that form the basis for the
Chayes morphology reduces the importance of the “public/private”
distinction in public bankruptcies—the techniques are not so new after all.
The public/private distinction looms much larger in “public bankruptcies”
however, if we expand our understanding of public law judging v. private
law judging beyond the Chayes morphology to include two more dimensions:
(1) the role of law; and (2) the role of settlement. These two dimensions were
added to the discussion by Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik respectively—Fiss
in his classic article, The Forms of Justice,28 and Resnik in her article
Managerial Judges.29
In The Forms of Justice, Owen Fiss turns from process to substance,
zeroing in on the relationship between right and remedy in public law
litigation.30 Fiss takes issue with Chayes, pointing towards the importance of
the “law” in public law litigation—a link between the legal public law norm
and the remedy.31 Here, the public nature of the right has fundamental
significance. Unlike a question of lien priority, or even of prospective
valuation of a firm, Fiss is concerned with Constitutional litigation.32 When
the case is about giving meaning to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution, or the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, or the right
to vote, the judge is forced to justify the remedy in a way that engages
fundamental questions of justice and national values. Resnik’s work on
managerial judging focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial
mechanisms for forging that link, raising questions about the nature of a
judge’s supervisory role.33 While she is concerned with the same question,
she focuses on how the judge may interact with the parties in managing both
the liability and remedy phase of these public cases.34
28. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 1.
29. See Resnick, supra note 3, at 377. Cf.OwenM. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073,
1075 (1984) (“[T]he absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement
troublesome.”); Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (1987) (considering
consent decrees).
30. Fiss, supra note 3, at 18–22.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 1–5.
33. Resnick, supra note 3, at 426–31.
34. Id.
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II. PUBLIC LAW JUDGING AND PUBLIC LAW BANKRUPTCY
JUDGING: THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF
LEGITIMACY
The most recent crop of public bankruptcy cases—Detroit and Puerto
Rico—illustrate that, while the rights being adjudicated and adjusted are
financial, the cases are as “structural” as they come. As a statutory (and
Constitutional matter), Chapter 9 does not (and may not) displace the political
governance institutions of a municipality.35 The same is true of Title III of
the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act of 2016
(PROMESA), which largely mirrors and incorporates the framework of
Chapter 9.36 Nonetheless, the restructuring of public debt has far-reaching
implications for public institutions, and can only be implemented in
partnership with political actors who will have to make hard political choices.
In her article, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit
Bankruptcy,37 Professor Jacoby looks at how, as an institutional matter, the
judge in Detroit created an institutional structure within the case that would
allow for the cobbling together of the so-called “Grand Bargain”—a deal
among the various stakeholders—and cleared the way for what appears to be
a revitalization of the city.38 While the rights at stake were not large “C”
constitutional, their vindication had far-reaching small “c” constitutional
implications. Cases like Detroit and Puerto Rico represent re-constitutive
moments for the polity. This raises fundamental questions about how
bankruptcy judges (or in the case of Puerto Rico, a district judge who used to
be a bankruptcy judge) should conceive of their roles.39
On questions of law and fact, the role of the judge remains, and must
remain, adjudicative and impartial—calling balls and strikes. But a
considerable part of the value added by judges in cases like Detroit may be
political. While it is possible to take the position that the “politics” must
happen outside the courthouse, the costs and risks of doing so may be very
high. Similarly, while it is possible to say that it is all politics, and the judge
is just a mediator, the legitimacy costs of taking that view are also high. The
“structure” of the case matters. The bankruptcy judge can serve a
coordinating function, but it must be done carefully. With proper attention to
preserving the judge’s adjudicative role, the bankruptcy court can be a forum
for adjudication, a location for bargaining, and a facilitator of conciliation,
35. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
36. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§
301–317, 130 Stat. 549, (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2161–2177 (2016)).
37. See generally Jacoby, Detroit Bankruptcy, supra note 1.
38. Id. at 70–71; Pete Saunders, Detroit After Bankruptcy, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2016, 1:17 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2016/04/24/detroit-after-bankruptcy/#3229363263d7.
39. See Nathan Bomey, John Roberts Appoints New York Judge to Oversee Puerto Rico
Bankruptcy, USATODAY (May 5, 2017, 1:59 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/0
5/05/puerto-rico-bankruptcy-laura-taylor-swain/101329204/.
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but the functions must be kept distinct. As Professor Jacoby has noted,
Detroit provides a blueprint, and Puerto Rico may provide a test case.40
A. THE PARADOX OFCHAPTER 9: DETROIT
The great puzzle of “structural” Chapter 9 cases like Detroit, is how a
judge can do anything more than approve or ratify a restructuring already
agreed to by the parties. When compared to Chapter 11, Chapter 9 can be
described as a stripped-down bankruptcy statute or “bankruptcy lite.” The
Code does not even provide the judge with the usual bankruptcy tools for
supervising a case.41 In a typical Chapter 11 case, the power of the
bankruptcy judge derives, conceptually, from the court’s in rem jurisdiction
over the estate. Indeed, the in rem nature of the court’s power has been
essential to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its cases on sovereign
immunity.42 A peculiarity of Chapter 9 (and PROMESA) is that no
bankruptcy estate is created.43 For constitutional and practical reasons, the
bankruptcy court does not take jurisdiction over the municipality’s assets.44
As a result, in precisely those cases where the institutions are the most
complex, and the need for a judge to steer a complex case may be at its
greatest, the actual formal power is weakest. To the extent the judge has
power, it is not a power to command, but a power to coordinate and coax –
to cobble together consent.45 To do this in Detroit, the court had to construct
a variety of structures and institutions within the case to engineer agreement
among the key parties necessary to effectuate a legitimate solution.
1. The Detroit Blueprint
To facilitate consent in Detroit, as Professor Jacoby explains, Judge
Rhodes used a variety of techniques.46 First, he used his power to adjudicate
those issues that did come before him—such as lift stay motions or other case
motions—as leverage, to push the parties toward agreement. He took an
active role in questioning witnesses, and cajoling parties. For example, where
the City of Detroit was not making sufficient progress toward developing a
40. Jacoby, Detroit Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 102.
41. Id. at 62–63.
42. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004) (“[O]ur cases indicate
that the exercise of [the bankruptcy court’s] in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does not infringe
state sovereignty.”); see generallyAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
43. Section 541 of the Code is not among the Code provisions applicable in Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C.
§ 901 (2012). Neither is it included in section 301 of PROMESA. Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 301, 130 Stat. 549 (2016)
(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161 (2016)).
44. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (the Supreme Court imposed limits,
based on the 10thAmendment, to a bankruptcy court’s power to displace a state’s sovereign powers).
45. Jacoby, Detroit Bankruptcy, supra note 1 at 62–63.
46. Id. at 88–90.
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plan for dealing with all tort claims, in a lift stay hearing brought by a single
tort claimant, the court suggested a willingness to lift the stay if progress was
not made on an overall plan. Second, while Judge Rhodes made use of a court
appointed mediator, Judge Rosen, to encourage settlement, the Court still
played an active role in evaluating and reviewing the settlements that
emerged from the mediations. Third, the Court created teams to help with
various aspects of the case: (1) a fee examiner; (2) a tort mediation team; and
(3) a feasibility team.47 These teams had different compositions, but each one
developed information for Judge Rhodes, allowed for outreach to affected
parties, and created information for the politically accountable parties to
negotiate settlements.48
2. The Legitimacy Feedback Loop
Through use of all of these ad hoc institutional devices, the judge in
Detroit was able to stitch together a Grand Bargain among politicians,
bondholders, and other affected constituencies. While each ad hoc grouping
was constructed differently, they each engaged five distinct elements to
achieve a legitimate and enforceable result: (1) legal norm; (2) information;
(3) participation; (4) consent; (5) enforcement. These five elements work
together in a loop. First, there is the legal norm that must be addressed by the
court. That legal broad norm can be large—what is the sustainable debt load
of Detroit? The legal norm element can also be narrow—is a particular
creditor entitled to go forward with their tort suit? If one looks at the three
teams—fees, torts, and feasibility—each had a legal norm that gave the judge
jurisdiction over the dispute at the front end, an intermediate institution for
developing information and facilitating consent, with judicial power
intervening again to review the agreement and enforce it at the back end.
A judge’s power, at both the front end, and the back of the case is
binary—grant or deny approval or relief. In a case with structural elements
like Detroit, however, the devil is in the details. The puzzle is how to work
out those details in a multi-party political environment that is anything but
binary. Here, the fee, tort, and feasibility teams worked with the mediator to
obtain participation and consent from the appropriate actors, in the shadow
of judicial approval. But legal leverage alone, without intermediate ad hoc
institutions to broker consent, would likely not achieve a coordinated
outcome. The dynamic, for better or for worse, was to use the leverage of a
legal dispute over a single norm to foster an environment where a legitimate
political solution could be arranged to vindicate the norm, without relying on
an exercise of judicial power.
47. Id. at 104–08.
48. Id.
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B. PUBLIC LAW JUDGING&PUBLIC BANKRUPTCIES: THENORM-
POWER PARADOX
This legitimacy loop suggests an unexpected overlap between “public
law” constitutional adjudication and ostensibly private adjudication in public
bankruptcies; this common feature might be called the Norm/Power Paradox.
Where a relatively “inarticulate” legal norm regulates a public institution, the
need for a detailed judicial remedy may be greatest precisely where the link
to a specific legal command is at its most tenuous. On the public side, for
example, a federal judge trying to deal with issues of school desegregation,
cruel and unusual punishment in prisons, or substantive due process in public
mental health institutions, may find it difficult to map a broad constitutional
norm onto granular institutional practices. The Eighth Amendment does not
say how many prisoners can be held in a cell or how much access to the
library is required. As a result, a judicial order on busing or prison crowding
may appear to be a naked exercise of judicial power unless tempered by
techniques of public law judging, with attention to the legitimacy loop:
information gathering, participatory consultation, facilitation and ultimately
consent. To accomplish such a goal, the case must be organized in a manner
that reflect the dynamics of the case itself, but with attention to the institution
being reformed. This requires a measure of judicial statesmanship.49 As
others have commented, this may explain the heavy reliance on consent
decrees in institutional and other structural cases50
In public bankruptcies the link between debt repayment and sustainable
debt load can generate a disconnect between the underlying obligation and a
granular remedy. While claimants may only be concerned with debt
repayment, determining the sources of debt repayment and of a sustainable
debt load requires social choices. While a water supply district or other
instrumentality may be concerned only with its own ability to generate
revenue, cities, counties, territories, and sovereigns cannot make financial
promises without considering political institutions and political
consequences. Public bankruptcies exist on a spectrum from project finance
(small) to country (large). The higher the level of government involved, the
weaker the enforcement institutions. This is true both in absolute terms—
there is no such thing, at the moment, as a court seized with power to adjust
national debts, and in relative terms—a bankruptcy judge has less power than
a sovereign. For example, restructuring a public project like a power district
or a stadium can be handled with the classic mechanisms of bankruptcy
judging. Detroit requires more creativity, but the tools of public law judging
come into play through the blueprint. When sovereign debt is involved, there
is no national court system that can intervene to coordinate a solution.
49. See infra text accompanying note 55.
50. Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 44 (1987) (offering an “analysis
of whether judicial involvement with consent decrees can be the source of their legitimacy”).
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Multilateral attempts have been made, for example, through the IMF’s
proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and through similar
efforts within the Eurozone.51 Nonetheless, today, national debts are dealt
with through negotiation among central bankers, rather than through the
courts.
In both constitutional and public bankruptcy adjudication, the link
between the norm being enforced and the consequences of enforcement may
be tenuous, while the consequences of the necessary exercise of judicial
power can be quite far-reaching. As a result, necessary exercises of judicial
power may appear arbitrary.
C. THE LEGITIMACYGAP AND THE LEGITIMACY LOOP
This may result in a legitimacy gap. Critical claims of judicial activism
or overreach may rest on an obscure link between a highly specific remedy
and a fairly generic legal norm: in public bankruptcy, higher taxes or reduced
social services derive from the need to pay bonds; in constitutional litigation,
detailed rules for operating a prison derive from a broad prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. The “blueprint” used in Detroit and now Puerto
Rico may offer a template for filling the legitimacy gap.
Bankruptcy judges and Article III judges adjudicating constitutional
rights are, therefore, placed in a similarly difficult position by the need to
give meaning to the Constitution in one case, and by the need to reconcile
payment obligations, the Bankruptcy Code and the Constitution in the
other.52 In both cases the exercise is complicated by the lumbering realities
of self-government. A court presented with a case like Detroit or Puerto Rico,
or a school or a prison in freefall, must make a fundamental decision whether
to rely on the parties work it out for themselves or try to help.
One is reminded of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure
case. There, in measuring the legitimacy of an exercise of presidential power,
he identified three types of executive acts: (1) those expressly authorized by
statute or in an area of delegated discretion; (2) those neither prescribed nor
proscribed; and (3) those where the act is incompatible with statute.53
Bankruptcy judges in public bankruptcies join public law judges on the
judicial equivalent of the borderline between the first two categories. They
act in a delegated area of discretion, or where the need to resolve a dispute
requires the judge to act based on its power as a judge. Attention to the
legitimacy loop described above may, however, allow the judge to expand
the outer boundaries of category one, where legitimacy is greatest. The
process of participatory negotiation around a legal norm, coupled with
51. See François Gianviti et al., A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution:
A Proposal (Nov. 9, 2010), available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/5087087.pdf.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012); see generally United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)
(discussing the scope of the bankruptcy power and limits imposed by the 10th Amendment).
53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952).
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evaluation of the negotiated solution in light of the legal norm, may permit a
bankruptcy judge to avoid less legitimate, more intrusive, exercises of power.
Robert Post has, in a different context, called this form of judging
“judicial statesmanship.” In his article, Theorizing Disagreement:
Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics,54 Post considers
judicial use of the “avoidance canon”—construing statutes to avoid
constitutional infirmity, as a way of realizing the ideal of “politically
responsive law.”55 I would like to suggest that public law bankruptcy judging,
along the lines carried out in Detroit, carries the idea a step further. In cases
like Detroit, it is not that the judge should be political, but that the case needs
to accommodate the fact that to resolve a financial dispute, politics needs to
happen.
Detroit needed to be reconstituted as a political and economic entity.
Municipal cases require that peace be negotiated among bondholders, public
workers, taxpayers, and the state, to name a few. At the end of the day, the
burden sharing must be accepted, and acceptable, by everyone. The same is
true of public law judging, where public institutions are being reorganized
around a public norm. The norm must be identified and vindicated in the
context of the particular institution. As in Detroit, the presiding judge needs
to structure the case to enhance the legitimacy of the remedy. In this regard,
the judge’s power is structural—to enlist the authority (and accountability)
of political actors in service of the legal norm. The legitimacy of the remedy,
then rests on the authority of the participants, rather than a standing exercise
of power by the judge. In Chapter 9, under PROMESA, and in public law
judging, the judiciary remains the least dangerous branch, but for that reason,
it may also be the best situated to adjudicate these complex public disputes.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the literature on public law judging offers a framework for
evaluating the judicial interventions in Detroit and now in Puerto Rico. Public
law judging, managerial judging, and judicial statesmanship are all on display
in these cases. But the legitimacy loop illustrated in Detroit may also offer
lessons to the public law judge about how to vindicate constitutive public
norms through a judicial process that makes room for politics.
54. SeeRobert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and
Politics, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1319–24 (2010).
55. Id. at 1319–20.
